State into public. The failed reform of State TV in East Central Europe by Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina
The Joan Shorenstein Center on the
Press, Politics and Public Policy
Working Paper Series
State into Public: The Failed Reform of State TV in East Central Europe
By Alina Mungiu-Pippidi
Shorenstein Fellow, Spring 1999
 Director of the Centre on Public Policy of the Romanian Academic Society and
Professor of Political Psychology at the National School of Government and
Administration in Bucharest, Romania
#2000-6
Copyright Ó 2000, President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
21. A decade of freedom and disillusionment
The exceptional history of Eastern Europe in the past ten years lead to the concentration in a small period
of time of a history that would have normally taken many years. The fate of public television is illustrative
in this respect. In only a decade public television in former Communist countries evolved from at first the
most powerful propaganda instrument (traces of this can still be found at the S rbia  Television) to chairs
of liberation (the public may still remember the 'Live Romanian Revolution')  and finally to a position of
increasingly minor media and political actors. This evolution was not only more concentrated than the
similar Western European experience, but also substantially different. Freedom of the press and
deregulation of broadcasting in ECE1 emerged in an unstable political and social environment, in societies
yet searching for an identity and a normative system to replace the old Communist one. The legacy of the
Communist times, consisting both in legislation and legal culture, the transition with its mixture of inflation
and fiscal austerity policies, and the desperate power struggles between the old and the emerging political
elites also shaped the fate of public television, the once all-powerful media actors. The final result was an
aggravation instead of an amelioration in the condition of these institutions. Ten years after, although
Parliaments passed legislation that at least formally transformed state into public television, commercial
stations became leaders of the market while public stations face growing deficits and a crisis of legitimacy.
Few studies focused on the role of the media and especially broadcasting, in newly-formed democracies, on
the relationship between media and the emerging political and social order (O'Neill:1998:3). The most
notable contribution is Colin Sparks’ (1995, 1998). Although some degree of political subordination of
public television by governments can be found in Western European countries as well (France and Italy are
the best known examples), Spain, Greece and Portugal only are models closer to the East European
situation. These second-wave democracies were, however, authoritarian and not totalitarian regimes: some
degree of escapism is usually not only permitted, but even encouraged in such regimes, while in totalitarian
countries it is not the formal acceptance of the regime, but the internalization f its official ideology which
is the main concern of the rulers. Totalitarianism, as religion, is indeed intent on conquering souls: its use
of television for this purpose could be the object of many studies. There are therefore almost no useful
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3theories to retort to when studying the transition of East European media from totalitarianism to the free
market society, and I could not agree more with Sparks when saying that Four Theories of the Pr ss is
‘completely useless as reference poi t’(Sparks: 1998: 179) in order to understand the developments of post-
communist media.
To understand the situation of Eastern European media after communism it is also worth noting that
freedom was not granted, but taken as the first consequence of liberalization. Only later it became
institutionalized to some extent; in some countries journalists opposed any media regulations from fear they
will be used to hinder their freedom. Even when regulations were eventually passed, pirate radio stations
continued to broadcast without a licence (Poland, Romania). Some countries were slower than other in
privatizing state media, but this helped little in controlling the media, since new private newspapers and
radio stations appeared overnight. The governments, either post-communists or a ti-communists, inherited
the control of the monopolistic television, some of the Communist press also survived, but -at least initially-
hundreds of new newspapers started, and this furious outburst of expression is perhaps, as Gaspar Miklos
Tamas noticed, the most important phenomenon of the transition (GMT: 1999). New regimes proved
however as intent in keeping control over state media as the Communist regime had been and state
television remained in many instances only a mouthpiece of the governments (O'Neill: 1998: 2). However,
since all countries of the region became first members of the Council of Europe, then associate members of
the European Union they became subjects to the latest European policy on broadcasting, mainly the
'Television without borders' directive. This lead in only a few years to the deregulation and lib alization of
the television markets. Private television was therefore established before the governments had resigned
to free public stations, thus prompting democratization, and showing politicians that more subtle ways of
using the media must be found in the context of the new pluralism. The Romanian state television, for
instance, presented the defeat of the post-communist government in the 1996 local elections as a victory,
but since other three private channels had already been broadcasting this only damaged its credibility.
Discussions on the ‘public interest’ were also fast left behind by the reality, as the new commercial
broadcasters broke all the engagements they had made when receiving the authorization to broadcast, so the
laws had to be revised in order to suit their needs- and the publics’ need to have commercial stations.
It is a common feature of transition that shows here: the new world is not the one people have dreamed of
during communism, looking at Western Europe. That model of Western Europe has either by now changed
so radically that it practically vanished, or is inaccessible to  East European countries. The transition
4towards ‘Europe’ is like a ship heading to an ever-changing shore you know how it looked like when you
embarked, but you have no idea what it will be by the time you land.
2. Aims of this paper; a model of public television
The focus of this paper is the crisis of East European state television,  its difficult or sometimes failed
transition from the state to the public, in the new environment made up by European regulations, political
pluralism and free market. The countries I am looking at are the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria. The period of time I look at is from the onset of democratic regimes in 1989 or
1990 till today, which means before and after  broadcasting legislation was adopted in all these countries.
The analysis I made is based on the study of new broadcasting legislation, and the interviews I made with
executives of public television, private television, politicians and media analysts in the fall of 1999 in
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. Last but not least my w -y rs experience as director
in charge of reform of the Romanian Television, and theinvaluable advice I received from Western
colleagues during that time made this paper possible.
Deregulation of the television markets provoked a wide debate in Europe over the role of the television, and
it was rightly stressed that you cannot have a conception of broadcasting which is out of step with a larger
conception of society (Tracey: 1993: 19). The two main philosophies concerning public television,
economic and democratic, are usually presented as being mutually exclusive (Atkinson: 1997). However in
this paper I will try to use both in the same time as I think in a society transiting in the same time from
totalitarianism to democracy and from command economy to market the two approaches are not exclusive,
but in fact complementary. Therefore, I shall look at the independence of state television, that meaning the
freedom of both managers and journalists to run PT and its programs as they see fit, as in any media outlet,
and to the performance of state television to transform itself into an institution able to adjust to market
competition and survive. I admit there is an essential difference between public and private television: the
challenge of legitimacy is more important in the case of PT. In order to justify its public funding PT cannot
afford to be partisan: it has to be objective and act in the public interest. The difference between state and
public television lies in the editorial independence; state television complies to the interest of the state
(namely the government) while public television is a 'trustee' of the society, performing a role which
requires its absolute independence from the government. This means that I accept in part that public
television must have a 'mission' as adepts of the democratic philosophy think. I am however more modest
5than to say that this mission is to educate citizens and provide them with a cultural and national identity. I
think other institutions are called to pursue this more in-depth approach and that television is simply not fit
to high culture. Its mission as I see it is to provide all the necessary information for a citizen to facilitate his
or her enlightened participation to the democratic process, that is, objective, in-depth and prompt
information. This might seem as a minimal role but in fact it is not. In the European practice it is quite
difficult to attain, although the enlightening model of the BBC is there to show this goal is possible. Any
further addition to this basic mission is only hindering the freedom of a media institution to search and
define its own identity, and  this freedom is vital for the survival of any institution, not only a media one.
As former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumi e put it:
'The independence of public broadcasting is vital for a democracy(...). Some say independence from the
political power is only a dream. I'd say it is a necessity' (Lalumiere:1993:18).
I am however close to the approach of the market philosophy in a few important points that I think
complement this model of public television I propose. One has to understand that state broadcasting during
communism was very different in its essence from state broadcasting in democratic societies, even with
some governmental interference. Journalists of public broadcasting enjoyed the trust of the communist
parties: schools of journalism were either infiltrated by the Communist ideology or simply, as in Romania,
only sections of the special school for apparatchiks of the party. Funding came from the state budget.
Employees had tenure regardless of their performance. Therefore we can consider state television as a part
of the public administration, as it is funded by the state, providing a public service and performing an
administrative function. It is not by chance these organizations tend to be over-staffed. Indeed as we shall
see in more detail later their staffs develop a self-interest seeking behaviour very similar to bureaucracies in
oversized states. The passage from state funding to licence fees was not welcomed by these institutions
since licence fees are not reliable revenues. Indeed as late as 1999 an executive of the Hungarian television
explained me that the only solution for the financial crisis of MTV is return to complete state funding.
I tend to look upon the reform of these public organisations in the context of the general reform of the
administration in EE countries. Some advisors and politicians tried to include public broadcasting
companies in this general approach to reform, but collectivism of either the staff or the members of the
Parliament were overall effective in preventing this approach to reach its ends, thus leaving public
broadcasting companies in a sort of institutional vacuum. In the model I propose PT has little choice but to
look upon itself as a public organisation which needs to become a consumer-oriented service and improve
its performance in terms of audience ratings, financial revenues and cost-benefit evaluation. Here, as for the
rest, EE institutions have little choice but step into the contemporary approach in the West instead of
6remaking the history of the West. For one thing, they are too poor to allow themselves to search very much
to arrive late to an economic rationale they could decide for early. For another, as applicant countries to the
European Union they seem to have little choice but to become capitalist even in the harder way. The main
institutional logic- in fact the only one- requires to devise institutions less and less dependent of the state
resources and a management able to make the institution survive through economic ordeals and keep
consumers satisfied. The alternative to managerialism or new public administration approach in this post-
Communist decade was not a different vision, but the absence of any. If in the case of pure administration
models are needed to show they also can be considered in the market and facing competition (Doel: 1979)
in the case of public television the emergence of private stations should be enough. In practice it is not: both
Socialists, because their are old-fashioned socialists (successors of Communist parties) and some liberals
who defend fair competition claim public television should not consider itself endangered by competition in
any way and pursue its old programme policies regardless of audience ratings. They do not say, however,
how public television is supposed to survive if giving up its share of audience and its legitimacy as collector
of a licence fee and reducing itself to a minimalist role such as the PBS in United States.
Good television is therefore competitive television, and the main indicator of performance is a quantitative
indicator, the market share. A second indicator is ‘iden ity’ , which is more of a quality indicator. The more
a channel is identified with specific, good quality programs that cannot be found elsewhere, the more this
channel produces ‘good television’. Criteria for the evaluation are more elitist this time: more than the
evaluation of the public it is the opinion of professional elite , such as journalists and critics, which matter
here. However the two tend to coincide in many cases. Saying for example that Euronews is be ter than it
used to be before being managed by ITN I make a statement that is common among European journalists:
since ratings for Euronews kept getting better it seems this is also the judgement of the public.
Some issues of independence have a strong effect on performance as well. There is however a clear
separation between areas which are controlled by the broadcaster (internal organisation, human resources
and programme policy) and areas which are decided politically.
3. The West European experience
Until now I mentioned only what makes the exceptional character of EE television. However, many of the
problems state television faces in these countries are common to the problems their Western equivalents
met a few years ago and were not entirely successful in putting behind them.  These problems are said to be
brought about by deregulation imposed either by technological developments or the European directives
7liberalizing the market, but in fact they only surfaced on this opportunity and in many cases had a previous
existence.
Achille Yves classified these problems in an 'identity crisis', a financement crisis' and a 'organisational
crisis'.
‘Identity crisis: to what purpose does a public broadcaster exist today and how can it be justified in a
competitional environment?
Financement crisis: on what basis does the financement of what television be secured? Budget grants
become quite hard to assume by states that display tight buget policies and, in general, take an increasing
liberal stand.(...) It rests only the increase in advertising or sponsoring, but this implies a less ambitious
programming, close to the commercial television.
Organisation crisis: the organisations of the public sector grew in situations of relative abundance when the
problem of costs was not as imperative as it became nowadays. This is why the structures of the public
service are not adapted to the present financial and programming challenges. The heavy organisational
structures and the ov rpowerful unions close to corporatism hinder the motivation and creativity of the
staff. ‘(Achille: 1994)
The crisis of the European public television is mainly a crisis in the conception of such institutions. Initially
conceived as state monopolies in an era when television (comprising education, information and
entertainment) was seen as a public good the states must provide, these channels are what the French call
'generalistes', that is, comprehensive channels. Their initial mission was to cover everything from
entertainment to national theatre and news.  Programming a high culture show after a popular drama, then
a children's show, then news  and then opera can work only if the channel is the only one in the market: any
scheduler knows otherwise this type of scheduling is a disaster. Most of these programmes were also in-
house produced programmes, due to the monopoly of these institutions. This means that the organisation is
nowadays left with a drama department, children's, fiction, music, game shows and so on. Due to the
European labour legislation at least in continental Europe most of these people do not work under a
temporary contract but under permanent contracts, so the organisation must continue to produce everything
in order to support them for the entire duration of a life-time. In some countries of continental Europe
unions are also very powerful and have a say on management of PT.
These are the general problems of PT in Europe. Domestic legislation and adaptability of the management
created quite different situations from country to country, so more than one pattern can be distinguished in
the adjustment response to the same crisis.  The crisis, to be certain, was brought by the deregulation and
re-regulation of the broadcast industry, prompted by technologic and economic change and the political will
8to create new opportunities for these (Hoffman-Riem: 1992).  The states gave up their monopolies as
owners of the only programme providers (in some cases, like Britain, this was renounced long ago, but a
private monopoly was granted to balance the public one) but they did not give up their roles as providers of
a broadcasting order. As private television was increasingly accepted, the state kept the power of granting
licences in exchange for a commitment of the private broadcaster, what the French call ‘cahiers de arge’.
The amount of intervention of the state in the requirement and enforcement of the respect of public interest
by private broadcasters is extremely variable, from high involvement of the state to almost no involvement
at all. Even in the case of high involvement it became soon obvious it is almost impossible to make the
private companies reach high thresholds of quality, since they could always claim it is a practical
impossibility, endangering their survival. So even in the over-regulated France regulations were changed
after private broadcasters failed to meet them. Overall, the broadcast legislation passed in the last two
decades  showed only that the states were always behind the reality. Hoffman-Riem was right to stress that
' in the event of a gap between norm and reality [supervisory authorities] they often felt compelled to adjust
the norm to match reality' (Hoffman-Riem: 1992: 147).
The main piece of European legislation concerning broadcasting is the 89/552/CEE, as amended in 1997.
However, the policy of the EU was shaped, on one part, by a decision by the European Supreme Court of
Justice, which defined broadcasting as a 'service' and the 1986 treaty requiring member-states to supress all
barriers in front of the free circulation of services, goods, persons and capitals starting from December 31
1992.  The 'Television without frontiers' directive only pursued this logic further, requiring broadcasters to
apply for licenses in only one member state, and member states not to oppose in any way reception of a
broadcast  from any licensed broadcaster. (Tr pel and Mahon: 1997). The directive, however, required that
a majority of European programmes should be broadcast, and it was completed by the creation of the
MEDIA program, meant to increase the competitiveness of the European audio-visual industry.
Once it become a matter of common European policy broadcasting could no longer be regulated by member
states so to protect their national public broadcaster. As I mentioned earlier, some of the member states had
in fact stepped forward in the direction of deregulation, partly because of political will, such as
Netherlands, partly forced by reality (Italy, Greece).  This lead to an explosion of the market and public
broadcasters soon faced an extremely difficult situation. The governments and Parliament of national states
did not make the situation easier. They covered the important deficit of broadcasters (Italy, France) but
were reluctant to grant them the autonomy needed in order to survive competition. A media committee of
the Italian Parliament once took 16 months to approve the quantum of advertising allowed on the public
channels.  Except for the BBC, protected by its Charter and in fact by the distinct British culture, in
9continental Europe some degree of political dependence is accepted. The RAI has each of its channels
dominated by one of the three strongest parties, the TVE is controlled by whoever is in government
(Escobar: 1997). Tenure of management in Italy, Spain and Greece is ridiculous, being a little over a year.
Even in France and Germany supervisory boards are politicized along the left-right cleavage and some
bargaining among political parties and 'sharing' of the main positions is usual. The German law seems the
best of what continental Europe has, granting important powers to the General Manager. The federal
government of Germany also makes the connection between government and public broadcasters less
direct, allowing therefore more freedom to the PT. This interplay of political influences is part of the
institutional culture surrounding PT in Europe and the removal of top management when the government is
changed is seen as a sort of political altern nce, when not actually embodied in the legal texts, such as in
Spain. This explains why these actions are not reported as incidents (except if not provoking a media
scandal) so countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain are rated as having a 'free' television in the Freedom
House ratings, even if this freedom is sometimes all but relative for public broadcasters. Looking upon
countries surveyed it is also worth saying that even if we speak of consolidated democracies and members
of the European Union the degree of freedom is extremely low for journalists in public broadcasting
compared to the rest of the media and compared to, say, the American media. The situation of the BBC
looks in this respect  like the exception rather than the rule. Although many public televisions started with
the model of BBC - such as the German PT- it is actually quite clear this model is not reproducible, The
closer in style tot the BBC is probably ITN, a commercial television, due to the long competition between
the two. We can also notice that the situation of the public media is largely dependent on the political
culture of every country. In countries where autonomy and pluralism have been long-lasting values, like
Britain and Netherlands, the government respects public media and public media strives to be an
independent actor. In countries where pluralism is a version of dividing a pie among political lites, the
‘lotizzazione’2 is the rule of the game; such is the case of Italy and  to some extent Greece and Spain.
(TABLE 1 about here)
As one cannot fail to notice, the situation is quite different from one country to another. Germany, Britain
and to some extent France managed to survive keeping the identity of the public television despite
important program adjustments. RAI and TVE, on the other hand, adopted a more commercial strategy,
and set out to fight private competitors on their own grounds. ERT could not decide which strategy to
adopt and remained somewhere between the two. The crisis only increased public's television dependency
                                                 
2 term coined at RAI to suggest the division of channels and positions within public television between political
parties; the term matches the ‘partitocrazia’ concept introduced by Giovanni Sartori in the democratic theory to
designate this particular type of pluralism
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on the state and/or government: as an enterprise with problems, public television is vulnerable and can be
caught in a crossfire between those who audit its management and ask for performance and those who think
the main task of PT is 'cultural' and that it should somehow refuse competition.
Anyway, it is important to say that the autonomy of the public media is an unfinished business in Western
Europe. The following resolution of the EBU, the European Union of Public Broadcasters, is expressing
merely a necessity than an already existing reality when outlining conditions for public broadcasters to be
able to be 'trustees of the nation', the famous expression of the British 1925 Crawford committee.
‘To perform this role, public broadcasters must:
•  be politically and financially independent
• give themselves legal structures allowing for dynamic management in a context of growing and aggressive
competition
• adapt their strategies to the rapid evolution of their environment, streamline their operation, reduce
operating costs, and increase creative productivity
• be able to draw on reliable, diversified, adequate and evolutionary funding, both public and commercial,
irrespective of their form.’
(Address of the EBU President, Albert Scharf, Bruxelles, 1993).
The important point here is that, due to this situation, that European supranational organizations do not
have either the political will or the coherent model of public media to export to ECE. They do not have a
model of successful reform of the public media as they have, say, a model of judicial or administrative
reform. This left public media in a sort of vacuum, and possible allies for its reform were not there when
needed. Indeed the approach of both the EC and the Council of Europe in the area was to push states to
allow private television as an alternative to the public one, than to achieve the dificult ideal of freeing
public media.
Journalists and executives who set to reform public ECE media were therefore resorting to their own
model.  In most cases this model was a very liberal one, as they were either trained abroad or have worked
for international public companies such as BBC. Of course this provoked counter-reactions, as these people
were seen by groups endangered by the reform as 'aliens', if not traitors to the national culture. In 1997 I
had to defend in the Romanian Parliament the requirement I introduced for the vacant position of news
editor-in-chief, to have been either trained or employed by some prestigious international media company, a
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condition all to the more necessary since Romania did not have any form of ducation  f r television
journalism.
It is clear to what conclusion I'm heading here. The only models available-BBC and the American press-
are a bit too far from ECE Europe, and they do not have any leverage there, unlike Bruxelles which has the
means but no clear model agreed upon, despite the existence of EBU.
4. On independence : the new public media legislation in ECE countries
Despite the explosion of the new media, state television, due to its monopoly and to the absence of an
adequate system of press distribution was by far the outstanding actor in the media after 1989. Television
could make a president, like in Romania, where people who rushed at TVR instead of other strategic
locations in town after C ausescu’s flee became members of the first government. A coup inside the
Bulgarian television in 1991 lead to the decision of giving fair coverage to the political crisis, which lead to
the resignation of the Prime Minister shortly. No wonder then the pattern of the first years was struggle for
the control of state television. Its reform was a secondary issue or did not exist at all. Both the institutional-
formal and the day-to-day approach to public media were shaped less by an abstract, imported idea of
public broadcasting or freedom of the press as by the contextual political and cultural environemen  of each
of those post-Communist countries involved. I think O'Neill grasped the essential when writing:
‘The media in Eastern Europe are a clear exempla of how past institutional configurations influenced the
process of media transition, shaping the contours of the present struggle in this area’ (O’Neill:1998:5)
In the Vishegrad countries, where anti-Communists came to power in the first free elections,
‘democratization’ of the television was an issue, and some attempts for a lus ratia of the public media were
tried, but they did not go very far (Sparks: 1994 Molnar: 1999).
(table 2 about here)
Either anti-Communists or post-Communists, politicians showed little or no interest in securing the
independence of state television. All the countries surveyed had passed by 1999 their own broadcasting
legislation, even if some already had either revised or proposed to revise it. The Czechs were the first in
1991, and Bulgarians the last in 1998. Although the BBC was the self-declared model indicated by most of
the Tv executives I interviewed, the legal framework enacted in post-communist times could not be further
from the BBC. The new legislation established public television, therefore replacing ‘state’ or ‘government’
control, however not with ‘public’ control, but with ‘public’ seen solely in terms of political representation.
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The broadcasting laws established a firm ‘p rt tocrazia’ in Eastern Europe: whoever has the majority in the
Parliament controls the public television, even if occasionally mandates of TV Boards and mandates of the
Parliament overlap. Even with the political control firmly established over public TV the practice shows
only a continuos struggle to subordinate and control public stations. Public media bills were therefore
merely catching up realities, and the delay in passing them had a clear political motivation. Sparks is right
to note that ‘’the laws were implemented not against the blank background of a new epoch but in a set of
circumstances where new habits and new patterns were already established’ (Sparks: 1998: 136) The only
important difference broadcast legislation made was for the establishment of private stations. There were
some illusions adoption of PT laws will end the fight for control of the television (Molnar:1999) Nothi g
could have been proved further from the reality.
· Appointing management
The most important issue for the independence of PT is how the management is appointed (and dismissed)
and its authority defined. Scandals plagued all countries surveyed, as sacking either General Managers or
entire supervisory of management boards is common practice. Before the laws were passed it was the job
of governments (like in Hungary or Bulgaria) or presidents (Poland). After the laws were passed it became
the job of parliamentary committees. The difference matters little, on one hand because the majority in the
Parliament is also reflecting the same political interest the government used to express directly and, on the
other, because politicians are united when it comes to protect their class from media criticism. As analysts
pointed out (Kleinwachter; Goban-Clas (in O’Neill: 1998: 37) these political groups, regardless of their
position in the right-left spectrum share a common conception of the media as an instrument of political
power only, notably ‘the’ instrument in the case of public television. The concern for either the public who
pays the license fees or the company itself does not exist. This is seen as a consequence of communism by
most of the analysts. I see it rather as a rational strategy of political actors in times of total anomie, when
they know there are no real accountability mechanisms. Had it been only a consequence of communism it
would have vanished already. But this behaviour, as the patterns of Spain and Greece show, will outlast
‘transition’. And the Italian model of ‘lotizzazione’ is strong, too: East European politicians tend to view
press freedom as a field where opposed view points may occasionally unfold, but from where the choice of
the journalist is excluded. It is true journalists abuse their right to have an opinion in these countries, but
regardless of that one must agree there is no good journalism without some choices being made. Journalism
is a skill, and journalists are not only hosts or intermediates of opinions, but they have the right and must
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acquire the skill to exercise their profession. Truth is not reached if each political party has its share: it may
occur that political party has a clue to what the truth is in many matters and the journalists need to express
also the views of civil society, and finally to reach a conclusion based on facts. During my areer as an
executive in a public television I heard from politicians scores of opinions such as a host must also have an
anti-Semite in a talk about anti-Semitism, or a newscast must present all party briefings, leaving the public
to decide if they’re interesting or not, and so on. One must however trust a journalist he or she can tell the
difference between a dull party or government briefing and an event with some news-value.
Despite this common problem, legislators did a better or a poorer job regarding this issue from country to
country. In Hungary, the first appointed board served for only a short part of its term and resigned when
the political majority was changed. MTV remained without a board from the summer of 1998 till 1999,
when the government appointed its representatives without the opposition parties appointing theirs. In
Bulgaria, the last country to adopt a media law, the Socialist opposition refused to participate in the vote
for the Board saying the law only makes control of government over PT legal. The Romanian Parliament
was unable to appoint a board from 1994 till 8, and a President of the Board since June till October
1998. In the case of Czech Broadcasting, the entire newly appointed Broadcasting Board was sacked in
1994. In Poland it was first the President of the Board who was sacked by Lech Wal sa (1994), then the
President of PTV and his entire management Board (1996).  On paper, the Polish and Bulgarian systems
look better since they seem to increase the distance between politically appointed boards (Broadcasting
Boards) and the management of public television. In practice the situation could not be more different: in
Poland the Broadcasting Board appoints a equally political TV Board, who then divides the five positions
of the Management Board also by party, although there is no legal provision to this effect. In the fall of
1999 when I visited the Polish Public TV only one member of the management Board, also an unofficial
representative of a Party was the only one to serve in the management with previous media management
experience: the rest were neither managers, nor journalists. And they had to decide over micro-management
issues, starting with the schedule. As one executive from the Hungarian television pointed out to me in the
spring of 1999 party interests are not even limited to politics and serious competition between various
cronies of political parties is constantly going on in the process of scheduling, commissioning programs to
outside producers, and so on. Not only the political pie is divided among political parties, but the rest of the
pie as well.
The Romanian Parliament even appoints the President of PT directly. In the October 1998 crisis due to this
situation one candidate was preferred by the Board, another one by the parliamentary committee and the
third by the majority of MPs who managed to impose their choice. The majority of the Board complained
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they have to work and take responsibility for their work with the one candidate whose program ran counter
to their vision of PT. In the Czech case it is disputed if the Board decided to turn away from political
influence when appointing 28-years-old J kub Puchalsky, formerly the manager of the BBC office in
Prague, or wanted a person without political support so easier to control. Puchalsky had important powers
in reforming the CT, however. He neither sought nor was offered some protection by the board when the
parliamentary committee was out to get his News Director ( see extensive reports on this crisis in The New
Presence, October 1998). The Hungarian system tried to take after the German model -that is, to dilute the
political representation in some larger bowl of civil society. However the same confusion between a
management board and a supervisory or trustees board reigns also in the Hungarian law, which proclaims
in section 55, article 1; ‘The management bodies of the Public Foundations are the Board of Trustees’.
The supervisory board, or board of trustees cannot and should not act as a management board. As the two
situations from Hungary and Bulgaria show these boards not only perform with difficulty these managerial
tasks (trustees are not managers) but sometimes can’t even be appointed. In Hungary the law grants four
seats for the opposition -the same as for government- but since the opposition now has both left-wing and
right-wing parties they cannot decide on the one seat they all have to agree upon. In Bulgaria former
Communists not only refused to participate in the vote, but they complained political cleansing was under
way at BTV, popular anchors being replaced from political reasons and declared the philosophy of the
media law is ‘cynical’ (BTA, 21/12/98). Such deadlocks can be catastrophic for a company such as MTV
bordering bankruptcy and left without anybody in charge. Nothing is less effective than provisional
management. But the Parliaments are not interested in the managerial reform of these institutions. The
accent during the transition was on programs and persons, and not on structures and mechanisms, which
shows a broad understanding of whhat institutional reform is supposed to be is missing. The lack of
understanding of institutional mechanisms is such that the mass-media committee of the Romanian
Parliament, when confering a mandate to the new general director January 1997 demanded in writing that
programs should be radically changed without the structures being touched.
Table 3 about here
As one can notice, except for the Romanian Board of Trustees the rest of the Boards are clearly
supervisory boards. They are in their turn supervised by parliamentary committees for mass-m dia and/or
public television. This chain of supervisory organisms only show how intense the obsession with the power
of public broadcasting was at the time when the laws were passed. The MPs are inclined to exercise their
supervisory rights to the limit of exceeding them. In the Czech Republic, Jan Kytka, CT’s News Director
had to resign because one of his employees, a talk-show host, went to one of his cronies from the
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parliamentary committee to denounce the reforms undertaken. After Ky ka’s resignation the man was even
appointed in his place. In Poland the parliamentary committee, more than the Broadcasting Council, is
pushing the General Manager to proceed with the reform of PTV.  In Hungary the Parliament appoints also
a remunerated, three-member team of a supervisory committee, a sort of permanent audit commission
entrusted with the supervision of the supervisory board.
· Legal definition
The  legal definition of public television is vital for its independence and its survival. Since on the model of
continental Europe, ECE PT carries advertising, its legal ca egorization is of practical, not only theoretical
importance. In the case of Hungary and Poland PT is now legally a ‘corporation’, although in Hungary the
unique shareholder is a foundation, “Hungaria” and in Poland is the state, represented by the Minister of
Finance. The Hungarian law tr nsfered the assets from the budgetary institutions of radio and television to
the ‘Hungaria’ foundation and not to the Radio or Television corporations. The Bulgarian law laconically
says only that BTV is a ‘legal entity”, while the Romanian law defines it only as a ‘public service’. In
practice these definitions help little, since these companies have to act in some occasions as public
companies, in other as commercial ones, have to pay taxes and cut jobs, and different rules apply for the
public and the commercial sector. Legal confusion only increases costs. TVR often faced this problem,
since the unions claimed a raise each time the government announced an indexation of w ges in the state
sector, and huge severance payoffs, although TVR not being either a commercial society or a ‘egie
autonome’ on the French model was not entitled to compensations from the state budget as other state. In
short, it was taking the worse of both sectors, having the costs of a state company but paying taxes as a
private one.
The legal status of public television is often an ideological dispute with practical consequences. ‘Public’ is
something new: ‘national’ is often understood as subordination of the truth to the national interest
represented by the government or some official office-holder. The 1994 Romanian law opened with the fair
statement that the companies of radio and television would be from there on ‘editorially independent,
autonomous public services of national interest’. However, since their property remained the state’s and not
the company’s, since the government decided value of the license fee and the MPs looked upon them as
‘national’ rather ‘public’,  little could be done to turn these companies really ‘public’. The Bulgarian 1998
law, the most recent of all, call the public broadcasting ‘national’ throughout the law. Even in the
otherwise liberal Polish law some wording is dangerously ambiguous. Article 22/2 of the Polish law calls
for the broadcaster to ‘in a direct manner enable the state organs to present and explain the policy of the
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State’. The Hungarian law, despite its complicated system places the companies further from the state
reach that the Bulgarian and Romanian ones. Employees even ceased to be ‘public servants’, after the new
law had been passed, in order to mark the total separation of PT from government.
· Financement
If the difference between ‘state’ and ‘public’ is reduced to the financing then things become a bit clearer.
PT companies used to be financed through both license fees and state subsidies. After the media laws were
passed the state subsidies practically disappeared, although they still exist as a legal possibility both in
Hungary and Poland. The license fee in the case of Bulgaria was established only very recently by the 1998
law. Some state subventions still persisted in the financing of the Romanian television after the 1998
revision of the law, but the government is trying to find a legal way to give them up, admitting it can not
afford to subsidize PT in any way. Depending on government for any kind of funds is more a burden than a
relief anyway since the governments pay late and may come up with conditions for their money.
It is interesting to mention some history of these 1998 amendments to the Romanian law. It took one year
and a half to the Romanian Parliament to correct the 1994 law. However the corrections were min r, and
all suggestions of the experts from the BBC or the Freedom House were overruled. TVR’s lobby was
successful only in a few  minor points, although these points were vital for the short-term financial recovery
of TVR. The MP approved finally only articles helping TVR with its urgent financial needs, but refused to
grant any autonomy that would have helped prevent such financial problems in the future. As in some
European Union countries the governments seem more eager to cover the deficits of the public television
than to let it free to become a self-supporting company.
The step from direct subventions to the license fee is an essential step in freeing public television from the
state. However it cannot remain the only step. License fees, a flat tax, are not enough even in Western
Europe, where practically all the citizens are owners of audio-visual equipment and rich enough to pay
around 10 USD/monthly (values vary from country to country). In Eastern Europe the license fee is small
(after being increased three times in one year the Romanian one rose to 1 USD/month, and inflation soon
caught up). Even as small as it is, evasion is high so about half of the budget has to come from other
sources. PT complain the license fee is not adjusted by governments to the inflation rate, still high in ECE.
In the March 1999 crisis only, the ROL, the Romanian currency, dropped from 10 000 to a dollar to 15
000 in one week. The value of the license thus dropped sharply by a third.
In such unstable economic environments, companies cannot survive on state subsidies or taxes. The value
of the license fee in Bulgaria is equivalent to the price of a newspaper. One dollar may not seem a lot, but
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since the monthly average wage is about 100 it is difficult for the Romanian PT to increase the license fee
without losing popularity. Commercial earnings remain therefore the safest source of revenue, but they
depend on the performance of the company, mainly its audience ratings, depending in their turn to the
freedom the managers have to compete with private television. The lobby of private media companies is
strong enough to hinder PT’s efforts to compete. Despite its financial problems, the Bulgarian PT was
forbidden by the new law to run  advertising in prime time until the setting of a national private competitor.
The law was sharply criticized in this regard by the Director of the Legal Affairs Department of the EBU,
dr. Werner Rumphorst.3
· Mission
We’ve seen so far how the companies are defined and financed. The next important issue is how their
mission is circumscribed and its fulfilment enforced. All laws specify the production of national programs
is an obligation of PT, although the emphasis on this and the quotas may vary from country to country.
Article 15 of the Polish law is the less restrictive, asking for only 30 % national productions, compared to
40 % in Romania, and 50 % in Hungary, who also asks for 15 % of the total air time to be consecrated to
national films and 70 % to European productions. The Czech and Slovak Federal law, ratified after the
dissolution of the federation by both Parliaments sets no quota, but specifies broadcasters are obliged to
produce a ‘significant share of the broadcast programs in such a way that the cultural identities of  na ions,
nationalities and ethnic groups (...)be preserved and that the development of domestic and European audio-
visual creation be supported’. All the states either ratified the European directives or are in the process of
doing so. This means quotas for European productions for both the public and the private sector, although
the latter received some form of postponement and American complaints based on the GATT.
All the laws have some general provisions regarding the cultural and national identity, the programs for
national minorities or children. These are however general provisions that should not hinder schedulers in
their effort to give a coherent style. More arguable are provisions in the Polish law regarding the obligation
to enforce Christian values (Article 21/6 call for ‘respect for the Christian system of values, accepting the
grounds of the universal principle of ethics’), and in the Romanian law the banning of ‘country and nation
defamation’(Article 5). Despite complaints from journalists, it is however the practice and not the laws
which create problems, although the existence of minor ambiguities in the laws offer the opportunity for
abuse. The only law that goes too far in this respect is the Bulgarian one. BTV is compelled to broadcast
live the plenary sessions of the parliament, and to grant public addresses to the President, the Chairman of
                                                 
3 quoted by Capital/Agency for Investment Information LTD-December 15, 1998.
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the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Chief Prosecutor, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court
and the Supreme Court of Casation.
The Hungarian, Romanian and Polish PT have also the obligation to provide and broadcast programs for
Diaspora. This is a heavy burden on the budgets of PT. In the case of Polish and Romanian televisions it is
a separate channel, funded by the budget, which is dedicated to this task. In the case of Hungary it is a
different television, DUNA, a second PT, with financial problems as serious as MTV and no chance of a
recovery, since advertising companies are not interested in Diaspora. Nationalism is costly.
· Conclusion
So democracy won less than expected by these new broadcasting acts. Their main merit was to establish
private television, and this decision will have more lasting impact on the demo ratization of these societies
than the adoption of public media laws. The in titutionalist perspective that procedures end up creating
substance is out of place here. This procedural framework is not even on paper an ideal one: it is a
compromise from a time when democracy emerged as a consequence of a revolution (Sparks: 1998) more
than an evolution. These pre-civil society democracies are not yet fully-bl wn democracies. Defining
democracy or public interest as dividing the public sphere among existing political parties is merely
depicting the partitocrazia described by Giovanni Sartor , the incomplete pluralism encountered in countries
with weak civil society.
The new management structures designed by ECE Parliaments for public television only show an outdated
conception of the public sector, seen as having unlimited funding. No importance is attributed to the need of
having a management empowered to take rapid decisions in order to survive competition. The emphasis is
instead put on ‘control’. This is a very familiar picture to ECE students. The whole conception of
administration inherited first from the French-inspired Constitutions after 1st WW, than from the
Communist regimes, is of an administration that is designed to control, and not to perform effective
services. The obsession is not with what PT should do, but with what it should not do. The public is
entirely disregarded, political parties being the only ‘clients’ PT should satisfy, even if this runs counter to
the interests of the company and of the public. different departments, often with antagonistic interests. Or,
the more areas are subjected to the political decision (amount of advertising, schedule, market strategy) the
higher the risk is performance will be crippled, since political rationale and management rationale have
little if anything in common. The shortcomings of this vision show mainly in the Hungarian, Romanian and
Bulgarian laws, although the practice seems to be quite similar, regardless the difference between the legal
texts, in all ECE countries. Once again, it is a matter of institutional culture, of the capacity of the political
class to move from centralism and control to subsidiarity and modern accountability.
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Public TV is only partly run by its managers. Instead, an ‘occult manager’4 is present in the decision-
making process at all times. It is a mixture of parliament intervention, government action or lack of it (like
in the issue of transmitters or license fees) and union behaviour. Unions are quite strong, since they are
based on labour legislation inherited from Communist times, favouring permanent contracts and making
any severance difficult. There are also many of them (the numbers are fluctuating, but figures around 10-
15 are common), making negotiations extremely difficult, as each union protects. This leaves little room for
managers.
However, they are seldom able to make the best use even of these limited possibilities.
5. Issues of performance
Both the public opinion and the politicians in ECE show constant concern with the reform of  public
broadcasting. Many of the concerns showed by intellectual eli s, politicians and the press are contradictory
and extremely superficial.. For instance, PT is often criticized for squandering, although occasional
management audits show it is under-financing and poor organisation rather than exaggerated expenditure
that makes the problem.5 Misunderstandings about PT’s role lead to other contradictions, some accusing
PT for losing audience, others for competing for audience with commercial television and losing its identity.
This assessment of performance is based upon clear indicators such as market share and overall financial
situation, and more interpretable ones such as quality of programs. The audience market share is the best
indicator of performance, since the financial situation is subjected to various other possible intervening
factors, like the size of the country or the state subventions.. The model set up by the BBC for the purpose
of cost-benefit reform is known as the ‘producer’s choice’. It was promoted by the EBU in a 1991 seminar
which gave endorsement from the part of the European organization to this British model. The model offers
managerial freedom to the producer seen as a manager and encourages competition between external and
internal production and personnel in the framework of a continuous cost-benefit analysis which becomes
the main rationale. The ‘producer’s choice’ was not applied by all West European PT, and only in various
degrees from one to another.
The performance of the ECE PT is furthermore affected by specific factors, which can be described as
‘transition effects’ and ‘development effects’.
                                                 
4 The concept  comes  from Italy, as does the’lotizzazione’ one. Pasquarelli, general director of the RAI, the Italian
public television, was the first to state publicly that the most important decisions are not even taken by the
management of RAI, whose choices are drastically limited by decisions of Parliament committees, government and
unions, leaving a very limited space for manoeuvre.
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· Transition effects
PT, as all the other state enterprises, was deeply hurt by market reforms. This meant high inflation rates
affecting the value of the license fee and governments reacting typically slowly in adjusting it. It also meant
liberalization of monopolistic services, such as transmitters, usually belonging to another state company
which liberalized prices overnight. (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria), making the cost of the terrestrial
transmission the major expenditure in the budget.
· Development effects
Despite the reforms, it took years for the market economy to start to work- when an where it did. There are
two specific features of underdevelopment which show in the PT performance of some ECE countries. Of
these the dimension of the advertising market is a factor of most importance, being directly dependent of the
overall economic performance, good in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and poor in Romania and
Bulgaria. The difference between the population of the countries is also important: a large country as
Poland, with more than 40 million inhabitants, provides in the same time the largest market and the largest
amount of license fee revenue. Romania is a medium-sized country (22 million inhabitants), while Hungary
and the Czech Republic are relatively small countries. The economic performance cannot therefore be
studied isolated from these factors which are beyond the reach of influence of managers..
Development indicators, such as GDP, are telling in some respects, but not in others. Data point, however,
to the fact that the number of TV owners is not proportional with other development indicators. Television
is the mean of entertainment and news of all, and the poorest households cut other expenses in order to
purchase a colour TV. Cable is a widespread phenomenon compared to some Western countries or the US.
In a survey on the urban unemployed population of Romania in October 1999 I found 62 % owning colour
Tv-sets, mostly acquired after 1989 and over 40% paying for cable.
(Table 4,5 about here)
According to this data it is obvious PT is in serious trouble. The loss of audience market share has
occurred in only a couple of years and it is limited by the reach of commercial television, not some other
balancing factor. Advertising revenues shrank accordingly, leaving PT at the mercy of the licence fee, that
is, again, at the mercy of the government.
Is this poor situation stable or unstable? The answers vary. Politicians are obviously happy with the status
quo and appointing their cronies or yes-men in various supervising board. I was particularly impressed by a
broadcasting board member who explained to me the need to have not only public television, but also
                                                                                                                                                    
5 Coopers& Lybrand  Audit Report of TVR, March 1997
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commercial television carry ‘high culture’. Fearing some confusion I enquired what did he understand by
‘high culture’ and what did he do before reaching this distinguished position. He had been the chi ff- of
staff of the President and by ‘high culture’ he understood ‘opera’.
Public stations, on the contrary, are highly unstable. Managers cannot cope with the tremendous challenges
facing them and in many situation they decide they can survive only at the expense of the companies they
run. Even relatively successful moderate reformers, such as Jakub Puch lsky, face chronic threat from the
Parliament. The strong lobby of private stations, which become more and more involved in the mechanisms
of funding electoral campaigns is a major contributor to this threat. Public stations need and want a change
of the legislation to free them from the vicious circle. But the unanimous opinion from the almost bankrupt
MTV to the still well off Polish TV is that politicians are not going to revise the law in its essential point,
the political subordination of public stations.
6. Solutions for problems
Since the governments, from various reasons, seem more indifferent than really committed to let public
stations die we can still find grounds for a more constructive approach, from revising the legislation to
better management.
· Revising of the legislation
The best system that can emerge of the present formula is a system with an unique supervisory board, the
Broadcasting Board6. This Board should have the task to appoint a General Manager of the PT (the
German model), selected on professional grounds, then only enforce general regulations, as in Britain or the
US (advertising limits, complaints), leaving both private TV and private Radio being run by the General
Managers with the help of a management team he or she selects. Political appointments and participation of
the PT employers or union leaders in the Board should be formally forbidden. In the Romanian case, both
were allowed: the result is that scheduling became mostly an exercise in accommodating shows of board
members as hosts or producers, with minimal audience but firmly installed in prime-time. Revision of the
legislation in order to favour professional management is certain to come: all countries surveyed were
invited to join the EU. Romania and Bulgaria later than the Vishegrad countries. This means tight deficit
budgets and less freedom for governments to cover losses in the state sector.
· Reinventing management
Revising the legislation is one ha d not enough, on the other it can take time. Managers will have in many
case at least to start radical reforms before hoping for changes in the legislation. This reforms should be
                                                 
6 this suggestion was actually made by a BBC World Service team, including Liz Forgan and Christian Mititelu to
the Romanian Parliament in 1997 at its request, but it was subsequently disregarded with no explanation.
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directed at creating modern corporations which work on a cost-effective basis. This implies fist an
awareness of the costs, an operation sometimes difficult in enterprise used to in-house production, where
the widespread pre-judgement is that everything which is not ordered outside the TV station is free. An
affective tool among many others when clearing the schedule from shows making most of the loss is to
divide the cost by the audience share. Expensive shows with no public should be cut regardless of whoever
produces them. Basing the scheduling on research is the next step: the public is the no l client and what the
public wants is important on all accounts.
Other important managerial steps relate to the adjustment of the size to the needs. Public stations can not
go on doing everything in-house as in good old Communist times, from clothes to iron ongery. This means
basically to pay continuously for low-quality services one uses only occasionally. The most important
example is advertising sales. All the countries surveyed have an inferior advertising market share to the
audience market share. One reason is that the public not reached by commercial channels is the least
interesting for advertisers, being less well off and residing in rural areas. The second more important reason
is that state owned advertising departments, with the limitations of the state sector (like the inability of
paying a commission per sale) simply cannot achieve performance. People paid as clerks cannot become
good and honest salesmen, becoming easy targets for corruption. The only solution is to contract ad sales
outside the enterprise, as the rest of services that can be better provided by the market at inferior costs.
This means severing, however, and this is usually a difficult job. But severing only on the basis of a
managerial logic at least works: severing per se, as the cutting by MTV and TVR of more than 1000 jobs
does not help: it preserves the managerial problems and saves little money, as wages are not such a major
part of the budget in these countries, compared to the West. (they tend however to be at least double the
average wage, and even more than double compared to wages in the public sector). Unfortunately, severing
cannot be done without some support from the unions, and the unions fear restructuring and the imposition
of a managerial logic more than giving up jobs. Restructuring programs leads immediately to restructuring
jobs as well. Promoting competence also saves jobs. The most striking feature of some TV stations on spot
is the survival of the departments of foreign affairs which enjoyed during Communist times the right to
screen contacts with the West, or serve a protocol function. Nowadays their staff makes itself useful
replacing assistants who cannot spell English and translating for communication directors who speak
uniquely their maternal language. They’re not handsomely paid- but while more people are still used to do
the job of one it is a clear sign no thorough reform was carried out. In the TVR staff in 1998 there were
more than one hundred drivers and no one else was allowed to drive by the unions from the fear drivers will
lose jobs.
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So many micromanagement issues are obviously at stake as well. ECE PT has still to fight the inheritance
of Communist times. Television is about teamwork, and Communism was about grouping people by
categories, not teams. The logical suit is an organization in which in many cases technical assistants,
cameramen, journalists and editors belong to different departments and sometimes unions unable to
communicate, not to speak of co-ordinating properly. One example is the work in shifts: TVR had to
negotiate with the unions to allow cameramen to stay after hours in order to be there when their piece came
to editing. Team spirit has to be forged anew to attain performance.
· Forging new identities
These are simple prescriptions, as management consultants, so unpopular with TV producers, even at the
BBC, usually give. Even more challenging is the task of forging an identity of public television. Massive
losses of audience and the effort to catch up are perceived negatively by the public. Focus groups
participants in Bucharest in the fall of 1989, when asked to answer to projective questions compared public
TV with an ageing lady using too much make-up competing with young rich bachelors. When seen as
‘cars’ the images were also telling: public TV was compared with a Renault 5 from the sixties, while its
main private competitor was labeled as ‘last-type Mercedes’.
When PT was alone in the market identity seemed not a problem. Now, however, it has become an obvious
one. What can make the problem soluble, however, is the shift of focus from the difference between
commercial and public television -as commercial channels are very different one from another themselves-
to the effort of shaping some channel identity, meaning logos, sets, costumes, tempo and profile of the
programs daily and weekly.  Western PT succeeded in this: one can recognize BBC, Euronews, RAI and
ARD, they have acquired identity.  ECE PT still does not have a style, because structures are not there to
work for it. Creation departments still work with the designers they hired in seventies who have tenure, real
research compartments do not exist and the notion of copywriter is still fighting to make itself accepted.
7. Conclusions
Can public television survive post-Communist transition? The answer depends on its competitiveness. PT
has no option than become competitive.. It can do so and still retain its role and identity, unless these are so
broadly defined they become an unbearable burden. Furthermore I doubt any good television can be made
today in total disregard of competition. One should only remember the competition between BBC and the
ITN in the 1997 British elections day. The European all-news channel, Euronews, had poor news programs
despite resources invested in it when it was a pure public channel heavily protected by member states who
were also its only shareholders: once ITN took up its management and 49 % of its shares competition with
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CNN became a target, and Euronews tarted to do live coverage and improve its programs. Good television
is competitive television, and European states who r  partners in the Euronews implicitly admitted public
companies must be run as private ones when entrusting the channel's management to ITN.
One can argue such a model is not possible. I look upon the BBC as a sort of ideal public television, but the
BBC carries no advertising so it has no connection to the market. Nothing can be falser: BBC has perhaps
the oldest experience with competing in a market due to the early existence of private television in Britain.
In fact BBC was the first public channel to discover that ratings are important not in terms of advertising
revenues, but in terms of influence, legitimacy, and finally as the main feedback from the consumers. When
a distinguished sociologist such as Pierre Bourdi u, who otherwise makes such a refined critique of
commercial television says that 'the audience ratings system can and should be contested in the name of
democracy' (Bourdieu: 1998: 66) one cannot but hear echoes of the fears of mass democracy, evoked both
by Tocqueville or Ortega y Gasset. The ratings and the polls belong to the same family as the Churchill
definition of democracy; they are indicators of the least bad kind possible. If it is not the public who
chooses one cannot guess who might have this right. The government ? The elites? The journalists? But we
have so many proofs that they will act immediately in their own interest, not in the  public’s. Since
accountability mechanisms- other than financial- to connect the public with its television- are difficult to
design, the audience ratings, the polls and the qualitative research remain essential.
The main intellectual delusion with the television is the assumption that if television is so powerful as a
communication medium television must use this power to be anything else than television, that is, a medium
for popular culture: notably it should be school, university, library, church, and any other Enlightenment
device possible. We should let however the schools, universities, churches to pursue their role without
competition from television. The television which tries to compete with them in this age of competition will
cease to be a television and it will lose its market to other channels without ever being able to match the
depth of these institutions and inevitably failing to force this message on the public. We have videotapes,
CD-Roms, the Internet, we live in a digital era: the school and the university can nowadays use multiple
media to target their pupils according to their interests and talents, while terrestrial  television by definition
has to target the largest number possible.
Is such an institution worth surviving? Looking not so much at the Western models but at ECE realities
public television seems still necessary. Democratization of the press does not always bring free promotion
of democracy in cultures which are not yet democratic. Instead it often brings free hate-speech and vested
interests. It is important to see whom the new owners of private television are before making them the only
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trustees of broadcast message. Local political culture dictates here as well. Journalists are completely
unprotected in the private sector where political interests of the publishers are sovereign (Tom szGoban-
Glasz: 1998: 32) and there is no widespread consensus among publishers independent journalism is a norm
of quality indispensable for their products. Instead, the widespread understanding is that as public media is
biased in favour of the government, private media should be biased in favour of its sponsors, political
parties or interest groups. If politicians and its own staff manage to destroy PT entirely or reduce it to a
chronically weak, devoid of any influence actor, it will not be the public who wins. The emerging  winners
will be these handful of businessmen who own commercial televisions, and probably nourish also, like Mr.
Berlusconi and Mr. Zelezny, important political ambitions.
Avoiding this negative development depends on civil society in each country. Czech intellectuals showed
their discontent with NOVA. Other civil society groups in the other countries have missed taking a coherent
attitude towards public media. They often accuse it to side with governments without ever discussing the
institutional mechanisms that could protect it from doing so or embarking in a campaig   to remove it at
least partly from political parties’ control. If they will not be able to invent or recover the missing link
between public media and its public, nobody else will.
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1 FREEDOM House ratings 1999, cf Broadcasting Freedom, leonard R. Sussman, e(d) Press freedom 1997.
Freedom House; ratings concern broadcasting in general, not only public media, and cover legislation, editorial
and economic independence, and incidents; for broadcasting the maximum (least freedom) is 45 the minimum
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Figure 3 Appointing management in ECE public media laws
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Figure 4. TV Supervisory Board attributions and powers
Operation PTV MTV CT TVR BTV
License fee NO NO NO NO NO
Budget YES YES YES YES YES
Schedule YES NO NO YES NO
Management appointment YES YES YES YES YES
Figure 5. Some context indicators of the audio-visual environment
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Figure 6.
TWO INDICATORS OF NDEPENDENCE AND  PERFORMANCE OF  PUBLIC TELEVISION
INDICATOR PTV MTV CT TVR BT
FREEDOM (ratings of
Freedom House)1
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1 The lowest the figure, the highest the freedom. First figure is the rating for broadcasting from a total of 45
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